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Abstract— The terms Pollyanna and Chicken Little are used 
as caricatures for those who are relentlessly positive and those 
who, in contrast, see problems in everything. Many opinions 
about automation in aviation tend to reflect these contrasting 
viewpoints. In this paper we propose the introduction of an 
ethical safety case as a means to reconcile these views by clearly 
articulating ethical issues involved in automation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of automation is growing in many classes of 
system that can affect the public including medical devices, 
transportation systems, power generation, and defense systems. 
There are many ethical issues with all of these types of 
systems, and considering automation in general terms is not 
possible. In this paper, we focus on automation in aviation 
systems. We investigate in some depth general issues of 
automation in current aircraft and particular ethical issues 
arising from the growing call to introduce unmanned air 
systems (UAS) (which are necessarily highly automated) into 
controlled air space. 
The notion of “autonomy” is neither absolute nor new in 
aviation. Modern aircraft engines are controlled by Full 
Authority Digital Engine Controllers (FADECs); the earliest of 
which were introduced around 1980. The introduction of 
FADECs enabled airlines to save money by removing the 
flight engineer from the flight deck. Here “full authority” 
means that the control system directly controls all the key 
engine parameters (fuel flow, for example); the pilot can 
request thrust but cannot “bypass” the FADEC to directly 
control many of the mechanical elements of the engine. 
A remotely piloted air system (RPAS) is more autonomous 
than a FADEC. With an RPAS, a remote pilot will make 
“strategic” decisions, such as changing a route, but “lower 
level” automation can be used for many vehicle systems, not 
just the engine, e.g. ice detection and protection. A UAS is 
more autonomous still, able to choose routes and deal with 
some failure scenarios, perhaps even deciding to crash land or 
self-destruct if it cannot continue safe flight and landing. 
These differences raise an obvious ethical question: “What 
level of automation is appropriate in aviation?” But this 
question is ill formed. Instead we should ask: “How do we 
design systems so that the level of automation is appropriate to 
the situation?”. This question leads us into the realm of 
engineering ethics, but first we make a brief terminological 
observation. 
We have already used three terms that are related if not 
cognate: autonomy, authority and automation. The terms 
“authority” and “autonomy” both have human connotations 
and are perhaps the most obvious basis for an ethical debate. 
Specifically, “how much authority shall we give to the 
system?” and thus implicitly remove from the human pilot. In 
our view, the use of morally loaded terms does not really help 
the discussion and we choose to use the more neutral term 
automation. This approach has the advantage of allowing clear 
separation of the engineering concerns of automation from the 
ethical concerns of “how much automation is appropriate.” 
Thus we use the term “automation” for the rest of this paper, 
except where we wish to make specific ethical points. 1 
Recently, in the UK the Royal Academy of Engineering 
(RAEng) has undertaken an extensive study of engineering 
ethics, and has articulated four principles [1, 2]: 
1. Accuracy and rigour, including ensuring that others are not 
misled; 
2. Honesty and integrity, including preventing corruption; 
3. Respect for life, law and public good, including risks to 
public safety; 
4. Responsible leadership, including promoting public 
awareness of issues, for example relating to risk. 
These principles might be paraphrased by saying that there 
exists an obligation to “do no harm” (protect the public). Each 
has a bearing on automation in aviation systems, and we return 
to them later in the paper. 
In the rest of this paper, we present a summary of levels of 
automation in current (“modern”) aircraft in section II to 
provide a reference, and then discuss trends in aviation 
autonomy in section III. We review different attitudes towards 
risk, which we refer to as “worldviews”, in section IV, 
reflecting the stereotypes of the title. Then, in section V, we set 
out the ethical issues which are raised before considering a way 
of reconciling these views, via an approach that we refer to as 
“ethical safety cases”, in section VI. Finally we present our 
conclusions and make suggestions for further development in 
section VII. 
                                                          
1 The specific ethical issues that arise with autonomous (the use of the term is 
deliberate) military aviation systems are outside the scope of this paper. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140010015 2019-08-31T20:26:22+00:00Z
  
II. ISSUES WITH CURRENT AVIATION SYSTEMS 
Modern aircraft are highly automated. For example, many 
aircraft are fitted with autopilots that can fly the aircraft along 
designated routes then land the aircraft at a (suitably equipped) 
airport. It is often said that modern pilots “monitor and 
supervise the automation” rather than “fly the plane”; see, for 
example, a cockpit video of an A380 approach to San 
Francisco (SFO) [3]. Note that this is a difficult approach, 
referred to by pilots as a “slam dunk” due to the steepness of 
the approach, and one where a Korean 777 crashed with a 
comparatively experienced pilot flying (manually) into the 
airport for the first time [4]. 
This contrast tends to suggest that “automation is good”, 
and some people take this view (see below). Of course the 
situation is much more subtle than such a simplistic view, and 
we now set out some of the issues in modern aviation which 
relate to the degree of automation and the contextual issues of 
how airlines operate, and how pilots are trained. 
First, automated can mean “unpractised”. Even if pilots do 
one landing in ten manually, due to the rosters under which 
they operate, even experienced pilots can find themselves 
carrying out activities, such as landing at a tricky airport, for 
the first time under difficult weather conditions. For example, 
the pilot of the Korean aircraft coming into SFO had 10,000 
hours flying experience but only 43 on the 777 and this was the 
first time he had ever flown manually into SFO. (Of course, it 
is impossible to avoid “first times” and the training process is 
meant to ensure that the previous experience means that pilots 
can successfully cope with new airports and situations.) 
Second, much of a pilot’s training is now done in 
simulators. Whilst the simulators are good and the training 
includes dealing with emergencies, there is much less 
experience of “seat of the pants” flying. It should be noted that 
Captain Sullenberger who famously landed his aircraft on the 
Hudson after total engine failure [5, 6] is “old school” and an 
ex-military pilot. His experience and decision-making almost 
certainly were the critical factors in the successful handling of 
the emergency; one might also speculate that he chose the river 
also on the basis that a (failed) landing on terra firma was 
likely to put many third parties on the ground at risk (an ethical 
decision, of course).  
Third, there is the now widely recognised phenomenon of 
“automation surprise”. The automated systems are very 
complex, and often highly moded. This means, for example,  
that one button on a control column may do one thing at one 
time, and something different at another. On Airbus aircraft 
pushing the stick forward disengages the autopilot except in go 
around mode; this exception is said to have been a causal factor 
in the crash at Nagoya [7]. Thus a pilot can be surprised at 
what happens in response to his commands and some of these 
surprises are well documented, but may not be rectified by the 
manufacturers [8, 9, 10].  
Fourth, pilots often get back control from the automation 
when something bad has already happened and the computers 
can no longer cope. For example, the A380 incident near 
Singapore [11] which resulted from an uncontained engine 
failure led to thousands of alarms going off, which was 
successfully handled by five crew in the cockpit. On long-haul 
flights two complete flight crews are carried, and there was a 
fifth (training) pilot on board.  
Perhaps the key ethical concern underlying  these issues is 
one of eroding professional skills, and leaving pilots with 
responsibilities that they are not fully equipped to discharge. In 
terms of the principles articulated by the RAEng, principle 1 
(accuracy and rigour) is an issue for pilot training, including 
the fidelity of the simulators. Principles 3 and 4 are particularly 
pertinent to the system design, and the willingness (or 
otherwise) of aircraft manufacturers to rectify known 
problems, including automation surprises. In this context, the 
effective design of the automation – the balance between pilot 
and technology – is the critical issue. 
Airworthiness authorities have reported on the underlying 
concerns for almost two decades [8, 9, 10].  The topic is 
complex, but the following [8] (p. 35) serves to illustrate the 
issues: “The unexpected pilot behavior evidenced in recent 
accidents and incidents appears to be the result of many 
factors, including the increased capability, reliability, and 
authority of the automated systems, increased flight crew use 
of and reliance on such systems, protective features of these 
systems (real or imagined), automation philosophy (or lack 
thereof) of the operator, and cultural differences. An additional 
factor may be that flight crews are becoming less confident in 
their own airmanship skills relative to the capabilities they 
perceive to be present in the automation, particularly in a 
stressful situation.” 
As a final observation, pilots are often “blamed” for 
accidents. But how many of these accidents involved pilots 
dealing with very complex situations that were exacerbated, 
not aided, by the automation? (Fortunately the number of cases 
where pilots were a clear cause of an accident, such as [12], are 
very rare.) There are many cases, such as the Sullenberger and 
A380 examples above, where pilots deal with very difficult 
circumstances; it is not obvious that these situations are 
adequately recorded and factored into design-time decision-
making. Thus it is perhaps no surprise that there is a trend 
towards greater automation despite the warnings from the 
authorities over almost two decades. 
III. ISSUES WITH TRENDS IN AUTONOMY  
The trend towards autonomy can perhaps be characterised 
(if it is not too much of a caricature) as “if people are the 
problem, take them out of the loop”. This is clearly the Google 
car motivation [13], although, interestingly, having got the car 
on the road Google is now doing a classical safety analysis for 
the vehicle!. 
This pressure is apparent in many aviation sectors, even 
without considering the military. There are already some UAS 
cleared for use in restricted airspace, such as the ScanEagle, 
which is certified for use in a part of Alaska  [14]. The FAA 
has been instructed by Congress to develop rules to allow 
commercial UAS in controlled airspace by September 2015 
[15]. In the UK an RPAS has flown in controlled airspace with 
a pilot in the cockpit for take-off, landings, and emergencies 
[16]. Amazon has said it wants to operate UAS [17], and 
Deutsche Post in Germany has done a limited operation with 
  
an RPAS [18]. In the latter two examples the motivation is 
economic; like the cost-savings that came from removing flight 
engineers from cockpits, Amazon and other businesses see 
potential cost-savings from using automation.  
From an engineering and ethical perspective we view 
RPAS and UAS as very similar. An RPAS may lose its 
communication links with the remote pilot; if it does, then the 
reliance on the automation is exactly the same as with a UAS. 
The details may be a little different, but for the purpose of this 
paper we can assume that the core problems are largely the 
same.  
Humans are naturally adaptive; computers are not. Thus the 
difficulty is either:  
• To predict and program for every situation that might 
be encountered; 
• To make the computer system adaptive. 
The first case we shall refer to as the “closed world” 
assumption; here we generally do not know that the system 
will behave appropriately (be safe) if a situation is encountered 
which had not been anticipated (it is outside the computer’s 
model of the world). This obviously relates to principle 1 
(accuracy and rigour), but it is very strongly influenced by the 
other three principles, which relate to what we should say and 
claim about our ability to achieve the necessary integrity and 
rigour.  
Building adaptive systems involves simulating mental 
capacities in decision-making, situation assessment (including 
image analysis), and possibly speech recognition and 
synthesis. 2  All of these sub-problems are really hard 
technically; solving them all together and producing a system 
that can mimic human behaviour is extraordinarily difficult. 
Yet, because of the perception of human fallibility, there is a 
desire to do this, and a belief that it can be done – and done so 
safely and ethically – which leads us to a discussion of world 
views.  
IV. RISK AND WORLDVIEWS 
It is possible to build highly automated systems (modern 
aircraft illustrate this);  it is possible to build adaptive systems 
(see for example [19]), and to address some of the other sub-
problems such as illustrated by IBM’s Watson playing 
Jeopardy [20]. Because of these (in some cases hugely 
impressive) successes and (perhaps) a belief in technological 
progress and prowess, there are those that believe automation 
is the answer; these we have characterised as the Pollyannas 
who are relentlessly positive about what can be achieved. 
On the other hand, there are those who point out (as we 
have hinted) the enormous technical challenges of either 
building systems on the closed-world assumption with a good 
enough world model that we can trust them with human life, or 
making systems which are adaptive, but where we are 
confident that the adaptations will be desirable. We have 
                                                          
2 If UAS are to integrate into controlled airspace in a seamless way the most 
natural solution is for air traffic controllers to be able to give verbal 
instructions to the aircraft in the normal way, and to get the normal responses. 
characterised this group as the Chicken Littles, who can see the 
problems in everything (but rarely the benefits). The Chicken 
Littles probably also think that the Pollyannas are “risk blind”; 
conversely, the Pollyannas probably think that the Chicken 
Littles are excessively “risk averse”.  
Both these worldviews have merits. The point of this paper 
is not to label either as necessarily right or wrong, but rather to 
consider how to reconcile them. We set out our proposed 
approach below, but expand on the notion of risk a bit before 
doing so. 
In safety engineering, the use of formalised, quantitative 
risk assessment (QRA) is common in some domains. The QRA 
models focus on aleatory uncertainty, which is more 
commonly referred to as random. A QRA represents known 
failure models such as wear out usually based on underlying 
models of physics of failure. Whilst this approach is well 
established, there is evidence that the results are not accurate 
numerically [21], and that many real-world QRA results are 
flawed. One of the reasons for the flaws is a that the models are 
limited by epistemic uncertainty. Put simply, the QRA may 
leave out significant factors, but we do not know what they are.  
The risk blind Pollyannas do not see the epistemic 
uncertainties and assume that the QRA (and other analyses) are 
effective and appropriate. The Chicken Littles know that 
uncertainties must exist; whilst it cannot be said that they 
exaggerate them, it is perhaps fair to say they are swayed more 
than perhaps they should be by the lack of, or limitations in, 
knowledge. This is a point on which we wish to focus the 
ethical spotlight – but there is one further issue to consider 
before we do so. 
The key capabilities of UAS and RPAS are realised in 
software. Software doesn’t have a physics of failure. It is logic: 
it does what it does. If a system containing software fails (other 
than as a result of physical failures of the hardware) it fails for 
epistemic reasons. This might be because of an inadequate 
model of the real world, such as the designers forgetting about 
the existence of the International Date Line [22]. It might be 
because of an error in the development of the software leaving 
a bug that can cause an incident or accident at some time, such 
as [23] where pilots eventually got control back despite some 
bugs that caused uncommanded altitude excursions of around 
16,000 feet.  
Software in modern aircraft (and thus potentially UAS) 
amounts to many 10s of millions of lines of code (MLoC). 
Whilst it is hard to get accurate data there is evidence to 
suggest that good safety critical code contains about one bug 
per thousand LoC (kLoc) and the best is probably about 1 per 
10 kLoC [24]. Thus a modern aircraft will contain thousands of 
bugs in its software – this might seem to support the Chicken 
Little view, but what little evidence there is shows that the 
dangerous failure rate of avionics software is remarkably low 
[25], which supports the Pollyanna view. 
So why does this situation pose ethical issues, not just 
technical ones? 
  
V. ETHICAL ISSUES 
Whilst it might be thought that the most extreme ethical 
issues are brought about by UAS, there are also serious issues 
with regard to levels of automation in conventional aircraft. As 
the issues are rather different, we highlight some of the issues 
in the two classes and consider RPAS which, in some respects, 
combine the challenges of both! 
We note that the airworthiness authorities (the FAA in the 
United States  and EASA in Europe) have important roles in 
that they act as surrogates for the flying public (and others 
affected by aviation) in making decisions about allowing 
aircraft to operate. Thus there are four entities we need to 
consider: pilots, airworthiness authorities, operators, and 
designers / manufacturers. 
A. Automation in Piloted Civil Aircraft 
We consider ethical questions in terms of the different 
entities identified above; this is intended to be illustrative, not 
exhaustive: 
• Pilots – under what conditions, related to the 
automation of the aircraft systems, is it ethical for pilots 
to accept responsibility for the lives of the aircraft’s 
occupants (and people on the ground)? 
• Operators – under what conditions, related to training 
and experience, is it ethical for operators to place pilots 
in situations where they are responsible for the lives of 
the aircraft’s occupants (and people on the ground)? 
• Designers – under what conditions, related to the 
intrinsic uncertainties in developing complex automated 
systems, is it ethical to design aircraft so that the pilots 
may neither have the information nor the authority to 
control (aspects of) the aircraft? 
• Authorities – under what conditions, related to the 
automation of the aircraft systems and the intrinsic 
uncertainties in developing complex automated 
systems, is it ethical for the authorities to approve 
aircraft types (designs) on behalf of those directly 
exposed to the risks? 
These questions are, of course, subtle and complex. Some 
of the context for these questions has been set out in the 
previous sections. In a sense the “Pollyanna vs Chicken Little” 
dichotomy (we abbreviate this PvCL from here on)  is most 
sharply focused for the authorities who have to act for the 
community, despite the fact it holds conflicting views. 
B. UAS 
For UAS the pilot view is no longer relevant; for the other 
legal individuals we consider the issues related to the closed 
world assumption versus adaptation issues, as these are 
distinct, additional, concerns for UAS: 
• Operators – under what conditions, related to the 
operating environment, is it ethical for operators to 
deploy UAS where they can endanger the lives of 
people on the ground? 
• Designers – under what conditions, related to the 
operational assumptions and adaptive capabilities of 
complex automated systems, is it ethical to design UAS 
without the opportunity for remote operation? 
• Authorities – under what conditions, related to the 
operating environment and the operational assumptions 
and adaptive capabilities of complex automated 
systems, is it ethical for the authorities to approve 
aircraft types (designs) on behalf of those directly 
exposed to the risks? 
As set out here the operating environment should be taken 
to include weather, routes, cargo, and the like. For now it is 
assumed that the UAS are completely unmanned; of course 
similar questions could be posed for pilotless passenger 
carrying systems. 
C. RPAS 
RPAS have characteristics of highly automated piloted 
aircraft, except that they are unlikely to carry passengers. They 
also have some of the characteristics of UAS as they need to 
operate autonomously if the communication links to the remote 
pilot are lost. Thus RPAS can be viewed as an amalgam of the 
conventional, but highly automated, case and UAS, with the 
added issue of when/how the RPAS “decides” it has become 
isolated and should operate autonomously. There are also 
changes in the notion of “pilot control” which again have an 
ethical dimension – the pilot is reduced to what the system 
“tells” him or her; there is no “feel” for the aircraft, no view 
out of the window etc., so the remote pilot is much more 
dependent on the automation which changes the emphasis in 
the above questions. 
D. General Issues 
There are a number of other issues identified above which 
we return to here as ethical issues. They are posed in general 
terms, in the expectation that many of them have to be dealt 
with either by the specialist community or, more generally, by 
society and/or governments. 
• What weight should be placed on QRA and calculations 
of risk, given the growing evidence that the analyses are 
often flawed, but the systems have been remarkably 
safe, despite these limitations? 
• What weight should be placed on the intrinsic 
uncertainties related to software, especially as the 
software gains more authority (used deliberately here) 
over the operation of the systems?  
• What weight should be placed on potential security 
vulnerabilities, which might mean that third parties 
could gain unauthorised control over RPAS (and 
possibly other forms of aircraft)?  
There are also legal issues related to design and operation 
of UAS (and RPAS) but they are outside the scope of this 
paper.   
VI. ETHICAL SAFETY CASES? 
The notion of a safety case originated in Europe, 
particularly the UK, as a “structured argument, supported by 
evidence, which provides a comprehensive and compelling 
case that a system is safe to operate, in a given scenario”. 
  
Whilst the concept is quite general, the practice (admittedly 
more outside aviation than within) is to base the argument on 
philosophical principles, such as Toulmin’s analysis of natural 
language “argumentation” [26], and encoded into special-
purpose notations, such as the Goal Structuring Notation 
(GSN) [27, 28] and Claims Argument Evidence (CAE) [29].  
Safety cases are hard to construct and may be developed or 
used in a way that is inappropriate or misleading. Whilst not 
expressed in these terms, the review of the Nimrod safety case 
[30] shows that it violated the four principles set out by the 
RAEng. Others have set out a more broad brush indictment of 
safety cases [31], but the basic principle of articulating the 
reasons why a system is believed to be safe, and also 
identifying the attendant risks, seems to be sound both in 
engineering and ethical terms. We take this as a premise in our 
proposed way forward which we term “Ethical Safety Cases” 
or ESC for short. We do not believe that an ESC can resolve 
the differences in views between the Pollyannas and Chicken 
Littles, but we do believe it can expose the issues so that 
ethical decisions can be made that take into account and try to 
balance the different views appropriately. 
We focus on two separate aspects of safety cases, which we 
believe are steps towards producing ESCs: the acceptance 
process and the articulation of the arguments. 
A. Acceptance 
Currently, safety documentation (although not formally a 
safety case) is communicated between the manufacturer and 
the authorities and subject to review before acceptance (or 
otherwise); in practice there is interaction during the 
development process, but acceptance occurs at the end. We 
propose some changes to move towards ESC: 
• Stakeholders – all the stakeholders discussed above 
should be represented and have an input to decisions: 
o Pilots – perhaps through trade associations; 
o Operators (airlines) – perhaps represented by the 
lead customer; 
o Manufacturer – perhaps supported by the designers 
of the most critical systems; 
o Authority – as now, acting as a surrogate for the 
(flying) public. 
 
• Formal review and challenge including production of 
counter-arguments. Legal arguments include a case for 
and a case against a charge; this is not suggesting such 
an extensive counterargument, but the selective 
construction of challenges should help see how robust 
the argument is for novel aspects of the design (this 
directly addresses the PvCL issue). 
• Formally agreed acceptance criteria to help focus the 
acceptance activity (see the discussion of articulation 
below). 
• Monitor and feedback: collection of operational data to 
assess the safety of the aircraft, as predicted in the 
safety case to proactively identify safety issues. 
With regard to the last point, at present accidents and 
incidents lead to review of the type approval and, if 
appropriate, the authorities impose mandatory design changes. 
What is proposed here is an extension to try to use data to 
prevent or avoid incidents and accidents; there are complexities 
here that space does not allow us to treat.  
B. Articulation  
At present there is little guidance on the production of good 
safety cases. Implicitly it is assumed that a design is good if the 
risks to life are adequately managed in the system design; this 
now seems limited and a richer approach is needed. The 
following are suggested as approaches particularly for novel 
aspects of design such as automation. 
• Set out both the advantages and disadvantages of the 
design: Identify why the design gives advantage over a 
“standard” approach, as well as saying what the risks 
are (this directly addresses the PvCL issue). 
• Define criteria (also used for acceptance) that force 
articulation of arguments beyond risk control, 
addressing the PvCL dichotomy, such as the following: 
o Where a function is completely automated, the 
result is “at least as good as” a human – this 
position is already taken by the UK Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) and it is challenging technically, 
but seems to be “correct” ethically – if we are 
removing authority from humans (moving 
responsibility from operators to designers) then the 
result should be no worse (ideally better). 
o Where a function is partially automated, the pilot is 
left in a situation where “authority and knowledge 
match responsibilities” and the result is “at least as 
good” as “manual” flying (as mentioned earlier, no 
aircraft is really flown “manually” these days, so 
this has to be a comparison with current design 
practices). 
 
• Explicitly set out the assumptions and boundaries of 
modelling and analysis used to underpin the safety case, 
which enables challenges regarding the uncertainty in 
the design (again implicitly a PvCL issue) as noted in 
the process discussion above. 
• Explicitly set out the resilience of the design, perhaps 
adopting the notions of anti-fragility. This is intended to 
be an alternative or addition to the use of risk-based 
analysis, explicitly dealing with the limits to knowledge 
(uncertainty) and complements the definitions of 
assumptions and boundaries (again implicitly a PvCL 
issue) 
The last point is relatively radical, and would need work to 
flesh it out. The ideas of resilience have been receiving some 
attention from people traditionally working in safety 
engineering [32]. The notion of “anti-fragility” stems from 
Taleb’s work [33]; it is adopted as a means of articulating the 
ability of humans to gain from disorder and it is perhaps the 
ultimate criterion to assess the adaptability of systems as giving 
human levels of capability. Also, recognising the short 
  
timeframes on which aviation systems change – as compared to 
the much longer timeframes for human development – might 
make us more cautious about levels of automation (the PvCL 
issue again). 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has raised issues concerning the ethics of 
automation in aviation systems, and outlined ways of thinking 
about the issues that may help in ethical decision making. It is 
very easy to be carried along by  technology and the Pollyanna 
view, but just because we can do something, doesn’t mean we 
should – which is perhaps a little milder than the Chicken Little 
view. Both views have merits, and we would view ethical 
decisions as ones that more appropriately balance or reconcile 
these conflicting viewpoints. 
We have set out some of the background to the problems of 
automation in aviation systems, but are aware that there is 
much more that could be said (considering military UAS, for 
example). We hope, however, that the brief introduction 
provides a foundation for the ethical questions that we have set 
out. 
The underlying aim in proposing ESCs is to make 
understanding ethical issues easier so that ethically-informed 
decisions can be made. Whilst we have not linked the 
discussion directly back to specific ethical decisions, we 
believe that making explicit those issues on which such 
judgments are based is a contribution to ethically informed 
decision making. We also believe that the four principles set 
out by the RAEng are reflected in this approach. 
We acknowledge that what we have set out, especially the 
ideas of ESC, goes some way beyond current practice and 
principles and there are significant technical issues to resolve 
before such an approach could be implemented. It is hoped, 
however, that the ideas will help improve the production and 
presentation of safety cases in a range of industries not just 
aviation – a Pollyanna view, of course! 
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